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STILL-IN-FLUX: REINTERPRETING MONTANA’S
RIGHTS-OF-MINORS PROVISION
Rebecca Stursberg*

I. INTRODUCTION
The rights enumerated in the Declaration of Rights of the Montana
Constitution are considered fundamental.1 Those fundamental rights are extended to minors by a provision unique to the Montana Constitution.2 Article II, Section 15 states:
Rights of persons not adults. The rights of persons under the age of 18 shall
include, but not be limited to, all the fundamental rights of this Article unless specifically precluded by laws which enhance the protection of such
persons.3

Like several other provisions contained within the Declaration of Rights,4
Article II, Section 15 is an invention of the 1972 Constitutional Convention.
Montana’s 1889 Constitution was silent on the rights of minors, as was the
proposed state constitution of 1884.5 In the decade leading up to the Convention, however, juvenile law garnered attention in federal and state courts
nationwide.6 The United States Supreme Court issued a series of decisions
gradually affording greater protections to minors, thereby reconsidering and
reframing the relationship between minors and the government.7 The Convention delegates were attuned to this shift when they drafted Article II,
Section 15. Indeed, the provision recognized that, at the time of the Convention, “no area of law [was] in greater flux than that of kids’ legal
rights.”8 The provision was pitched to voters as a “[n]ew provision giving
* Rebecca Stursberg is a student at the University of Montana School of Law. She would like to
thank Professor Anthony Johnstone for his inspiration and guidance, as well as her colleagues on the
Montana Law Review for their hard work.
1. Butte Community Union v. Lewis, 712 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Mont. 1986) (quoting In re C.H., 683
P.2d 931, 940 (Mont. 1984)), superseded by constitutional amendment as recognized in Zempel v. Uninsured Emp’rs’ Fund, 938 P.2d 658 (Mont. 1997) and Wadsworth v. State, 911 P.2d 1165 (Mont. 1996)).
2. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 15.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art. II, §§ 8–10.
5. RICK APPLEGATE, BILL OF RIGHTS STUDY 301 (Mont. Constitutional Convention Study No. 10,
1972).
6. Id. at 301.
7. See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
8. APPLEGATE, supra note 5, at 301.
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children all of the rights that adults have unless a law meant to protect
children prohibits their enjoyment of the right.”9
This note explores how this provision, referred to interchangeably as
Article II, Section 15 and the rights-of-minors provision throughout, has
developed since its adoption. Part II of this note discusses the sources of the
provision, including key United States Supreme Court precedent on juvenile rights in the years immediately before the Convention, and the evolution of the provision through several stages of the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention. Part III examines the structure and substance of Article
II, Section 15 by dividing the provision into three subparts and illustrating
how each sub-part functions through relevant Montana Supreme Court decisions. Part IV discusses the potential flaws of the Court’s interpretation and
application of the rights-of-minors provision by focusing again on each subpart, and suggests new approaches to understanding and applying its rules.
Part V concludes the note.
II. HISTORICAL AND JURISPRUDENTIAL SOURCES
RIGHTS-OF-MINORS PROVISION

OF THE

This part details the historical and doctrinal background of Article II,
Section 15. As mentioned, the rights of minors received increasing attention
in the years leading up to the Montana Constitutional Convention in both
state and federal courts, as well as society at large. This context helps to
explain Montana’s impetus in creating and adopting a rights-of-minors provision.
A. Constitutional Convention Commission Study
In 1967, the Montana Legislature formed a Legislative Council to
study whether the current Montana Constitution, drafted in 1889, adequately served the needs of a changing, increasingly urban electorate.10 The
Council recommended substantial constitutional revision, and in 1970 Montana voters approved a referendum to amend the Constitution.11 The state
legislature quickly established the Montana Constitutional Convention
Commission to prepare for the upcoming convention.12 In turn, the Commission hired a team of analysts and researchers to prepare reports on each
9. PROPOSED 1972 CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF MONTANA: OFFICIAL TEXT WITH EXPLANA6 (1972) [hereinafter VOTER INFORMATION PAMPHLET].
10. LARRY M. ELISON & FRITZ SNYDER, THE MONTANA STATE CONSTITUTION 8 (G. Alan Tar ed.,
The Oxford Cmts. on the State Constitutions of the U.S., 2011).
11. Id. at 9.
12. Id.
TION,
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issue to be addressed in the new constitution.13 The Convention delegates—
elected by Montana voters to draft the new constitution—relied on these
reports for education and guidance throughout the drafting process.14 One
of the delegates selected, Rick Applegate, researched and prepared the Declaration of Rights Commission Study.15 In it, Applegate evaluated the Declaration of Rights of the 1889 Constitution and considered some of the legal
and political trends of the time that might call for revision or deletion of
existing provisions and incorporation of new ones.16 The study explored
three entirely new areas of individual rights.17 One of those areas was the
rights of minors.18
The 1960s witnessed significant change in the arena of juvenile law.
Two common battlegrounds for this movement were juvenile courts and
public schools.19 Applegate’s study drew directly from then-recent court
decisions, academic work, and efforts by both governmental and citizen-led
groups to lay the foundation for Article II, Section 15.20 In particular, he
directly cited several United States Supreme Court and other federal decisions concerning the rights of minors in schools and in the courts.21 It is
important to briefly discuss this precedent and to touch on additional
sources to understand the backdrop for the proposal and ultimate ratification of Article II, Section 15.
1. Federal Precedent
Beginning with Kent v. United States in 1966, the United State Supreme Court incrementally extended constitutional protections to minors in
conflict with the law.22 In Kent, a 16-year-old boy was arrested in connection with a rape and armed robbery.23 Police interrogated the boy for seven
13. Id.
14. Id. at 12.
15. APPLEGATE, supra note 5, at 301.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
20. APPLEGATE, supra note 5, at 301–05.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Kent, 383 U.S. 541. (holding that juvenile court’s waiver of exclusive jurisdiction
over a youth charged with a criminal offense requires basic due process, including a hearing with assistance of counsel); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding juvenile delinquency proceedings must
comport with due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and guaranteeing to youths in those proceedings timely notice of charges, the right to counsel, the right to remain silent, and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses); Tinker, 393 U.S. 503 (holding suspension of school children for
wearing black armbands in protest of U.S. involvement in Vietnam violated those students’ First
Amendment rights to free speech and freedom of expression).
23. Kent, 383 U.S. at 543.
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hours that day, and again the following morning until five in the evening.24
The boy was detained for almost a week at a home for children without
arraignment or a determination by a judicial officer that probable cause existed for his apprehension.25 The boy’s mother retained counsel, who filed
motions with the juvenile court requesting a hearing on the question of
waiver of its jurisdiction, arguing that the juvenile court should retain jurisdiction because his client was suitable for rehabilitation under its auspices.26 That court declined to rule on the motions, hold a hearing, or confer
with the boy, his attorney or parents, and the court waived jurisdiction without making findings or providing a justification.27 The boy was ultimately
convicted. After numerous appeals, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed.28 It held that a juvenile court’s waiver of
exclusive jurisdiction over a youth charged with a criminal offense requires
basic due process, including a hearing with the assistance of counsel.29
Not long after its decision in Kent, the United States Supreme Court
decided the landmark juvenile rights case In re Gault. There, a 15-year-old
boy was taken into police custody and committed to the Arizona State Industrial School until his 21st birthday for making lewd phone calls to his
neighbor.30 In reversing, the Court remarked, “the condition of being a boy
does not justify a kangaroo court.”31 The Court held that minors in delinquency proceedings are entitled to certain due process protections, including the right to counsel, timely notice of charges, the right to remain silent,
and the right to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses because
these protections are implicit within the concept of fundamental fairness
and due process.32 The following year, the Court held that the burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt also falls among the “essentials of due
process and fair treatment” guaranteed to youth in delinquency proceedings.33
Shortly after Gault, the United States Supreme Court decided a seminal students’ rights case, Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District.
In Tinker, three junior high and high school students were suspended for
wearing black armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam War.34 The
Court held that children, as “persons” under the United States Constitution,
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 543–44.
Id. at 544–45.
Id.
Id. at 546.
Id. at 551–52, 563.
Id. at 561–62.
Id. at 4, 7.
Id. at 28.
Id.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359, 364 (1970).
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
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possess constitutional rights, including the freedom of speech and freedom
of expression. “It can hardly be argued,” the Court cautioned, “that students
or teachers shed their constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate.”35 In
the wake of Tinker—and often citing to it—students across the country continued to challenge school codes and regulations.36 One area subject to frequent litigation was the constitutionality of school codes proscribing student
hair length.37 Courts diverged on the issue but generally based their holdings on whether the hair style was shown to disrupt the school environment
and educational process.38 On the eve of the Convention, a federal district
court in Montana upheld a Hamilton High School hair code and the suspension of a student who had violated it.39
2. Additional Sources
In addition to federal precedent, the Commission study drew directly
from a variety of primary and secondary sources in its discussion of the
rights of minors. These sources included law review articles, a collection of
essays, and a book titled, “Up Against the Law: The Legal Rights of People
Under 21,” effectively a layman’s pocket guide to juvenile rights in the
United States.40 Additionally, the study cited three separate proposals for
rights-of-minors provisions advanced by governmental and citizen-led organizations.41 To conclude the study, Applegate cited a report from the 1970
White House Conference on Children.42 “[T]he main question is not
whether the rights of young persons . . . are identical with those of adults
. . . . [T]he issue is ‘how the limits of adult control may be drawn so as not
to infringe on the child’s right to grow in freedom in accordance with the
spirit of civil liberties embodied in the Constitution.’”43
35. Id. at 506.
36. APPLEGATE, supra note 5, at 302.
37. Id. (citing James D. Moore, In-Hair-Ent Rights and Tonsorial Tutelage, 32 MONT. L. REV. 294
(1971)); see, e.g., Meyers v. Arcata Union High Sch. Dist., 75 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1969); Yoo v. Moynihan,
262 A.2d 814 (Conn. 1969); Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wis. 1969); Richards v. Thurston,
304 F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1969); Griffin v. Tatum, 425 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1970); Crossen v. Fatsi, 309
F. Supp. 114 (D. Conn. 1970); Reichenberg v. Nelson, 310 F. Supp. 248 (D. Neb. 1970); Farrell v.
Smith, 310 F. Sup. 732 (D. Maine 1970); Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411 (D. Ver. 1970); Corley
v. Daubauer, 312 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Ark. 1970); Whitsell v. Pampas Indep. Sch. Dist., 316 F. Supp. 852
(N.D. Tex. 1970).
38. See, e.g., Breen, 296 F. Supp. 702; Reichenberg, 310 F. Supp. 248; Whitsell, 316 F. Supp. 852.
39. APPLEGATE, supra note 5, at 302.
40. Id. at 301 n.1.
41. Id. at 304 n.13, 305 n.14.
42. Id. at 302 n.3, 303 n.7, 305 n.18.
43. Id. at 305 (quoting a report from the White House Conference on Children).
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B. Constitutional Convention
It was against this backdrop that the Convention delegates drafted and
adopted a unique rights-of-minors provision. With the aid of Applegate’s
study and an eye to Gault, Tinker, and the hair-length cases, the Bill of
Rights Committee set out to ensure “that persons under the age of majority
have the same protections from governmental and majoritarian abuses as do
adults.”44
Delegate Monroe introduced the provision on the Convention floor:
The committee took this action in recognition of the fact that young people
have not been held to possess basic civil rights—although it has been held
that they are persons under the due process clause of the 14th Amendment,
the Supreme Court has not ruled in their favor under the equal protection
clause of that same amendment . . . . [T]he broad outline of the kinds of
rights young people possess does not yet exist.45

The delegates acknowledged the inherent difficulty in defining the scope of
juvenile rights.46 As Applegate discussed, the trend in federal and state
courts at the time appeared to afford youth greater procedural and substantive protections, especially in the juvenile justice system.47 However, he
noted, courts still recognized a valid distinction between children and adults
and agreed that minors require special treatment by the institutions with
which they interact.48 Thus, the issue in crafting the rights-of-minors provision became how to delimit adult control so as not to infringe on children’s
rights “to grow in freedom in accordance with the spirit of civil liberties
embodied in the Constitution.”49
To strike this balance between granting special treatment to minors
while still providing civil liberties, the Framers included in the provision an
exception to the general rule that minors have the same fundamental rights
as adults: certain laws may infringe those rights based on a clear showing
that the protection of the special status of minors is enhanced.50 This balancing act makes clear that Article II, Section 15 rests on the two oftencompeting premises that youth should have the same fundamental rights as
adults and that youth are fundamentally different from adults.
Several delegates voiced their skepticism about the purpose and utility
of Article II, Section 15. After Delegate Monroe introduced the provision
on the Convention floor, the following debate ensued:
44. 5 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT 1750 (1979) [hereinafter
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT]; 2 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT 636 (1979).
45. 5 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT, supra note 44, at 1750.
46. Id. at 1750–51.
47. APPLEGATE, supra note 5, at 303.
48. Id. at 301.
49. Id. at 305 (quoting a report from the White House Conference on Children).
50. 5 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT, supra note 44, at 1750.
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DELEGATE RYGG: I’m just wondering—I read this and I still wonder.
Could you give me an example of what we’re doing? Just one concrete
example so that I could find out just what you’re trying to do?
DELEGATE MONROE: [Y]oung people are not generally protected by
constitutional standards of fairness and due process of law, such as the right
to counsel, trial by peers or jury, the right against self-incrimination, and the
right to know the nature and cause of accusation . . . . I’ve got a file in here;
the Montana Advisory Council on Children and Youth has compiled documentation of specific instances where a child’s—or rights of children and
youth are just nonexistent, really.

Other delegates echoed Delegate Rygg’s confusion.
DELEGATE BROWN: Mr. Chairman, I don’t see, really, the purpose of
this article, even after the explanation. The Bill of Rights covers all people,
and it doesn’t say only those over the age of majority or those over 65 or
anything else; it covers all people . . . . And, I really don’t see where this
serves any useful purpose.

This time, Delegate Dahood attempted to clarify the purpose of the provision, framing it in different terms than those used by Delegate Brown.
DELEGATE DAHOOD: There is a constitutional controversy through this
land as to whether or not the basic protections of the Bill of Rights shall be
applied to those persons who are not adults, with respect to arrest, detention
and trial . . . . [W]hat we are doing by this article is focusing on the basic
guarantees that citizens have with respect to their person, their property and
their liberty . . . . All we’re going to do is make sure that the young boys and
the young girls, the young men, the young women, prior to reaching the age
of majority, are going to know that during that particular period of maturity
they shall have all the basic rights that are accorded to all citizens of the
State of Montana, and they are going to be better trained to be more responsible citizens . . . . [T]his will make sure that this Constitution and this Bill
of Rights does apply to all citizens regardless of age.51

The debate leaves certain questions unanswered. For instance, while
Delegate Dahood made clear that the Bill of Rights applies to all citizens
regardless of age, the plain text of the provision permits the limitation of
certain rights to “enhance the protection of minors.” Yet, the delegates did
not clearly define what it means to enhance the protection of minors. Delegate Monroe cited laws defining the legal drinking age or setting forth
driver’s license requirements as examples since such laws are designed specifically to protect minors.52 Beyond that, the delegates provided little guidance for the courts, lawmakers, and litigators. Furthermore, the delegates
did not specifically address the provision’s “but not limited to” language.
The only likely reference to the language is Delegate Monroe’s statement
that “whatever rights and privileges might be given to [young people] in the
51. Id. at 1751.
52. Id.
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future, we also want to protect.”53 Ultimately, Article II, Section 15 was
adopted with a vote of 76–11.54 Nevertheless, the confusion voiced by Delegates Rygg and Brown still plagues the provision.
C. Ratification
To educate voters prior to the election, the Convention delegates circulated a voter information pamphlet, equipped with an explanation of most
sections of the proposed constitution.55 The pamphlet presented Article II,
Section 15 as a “[n]ew provision giving children all of the rights that adults
have unless a law meant to protect children prohibits their enjoyment of the
right.”56 Another pamphlet widely circulated in Montana prior to the vote,
the Roeder Pamphlet, described Article II, Section 15 as follows: “Section
14 declares that 18 is the age of adulthood for all purposes. Section 15
attempts to extend to those under 18 the procedural safeguards and rights
extended adults. It stresses that when society proceeds on the assumption
that minors need special treatment in the legal process it must also be careful not to abridge other rights.”57 The Neely Critical Look, yet another information pamphlet circulated to Montana voters, explained that the “effect
of the provision will eventually be felt in . . . criminal law and school supervision.”58
III. ANATOMY

RIGHTS-OF-MINORS PROVISION:
MONTANA COURTS

OF THE

Rights of persons not adults. The rights of persons under the age of 18 shall
include, but not be limited to, all the fundamental rights of this Article unless specifically precluded by laws which enhance the protection of such
persons.59

This part of the note explains Article II, Section 15 by dividing the
provision into three sub-sections: the general rule, the exception to the general rule for “enhanced protections,” and the “but not be limited to” language, respectively. It will discuss relevant case law to assess how Montana
courts have interpreted each sub-section, and lay the groundwork for Part
IV, which will address flaws in the courts’ interpretation and application of
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id. at 1751–52.
ELISON & SNYDER, supra note 10, at 5.
VOTER INFORMATION PAMPHLET 6 (1972).
CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL IMPROVEMENT, PROPOSED CONSTITUTION FOR THE
STATE OF MONTANA 2 (1972), available at https://perma.cc/3WL6-ZA9K (last visited Aug. 14, 2018).
58. GERALD J. NEELY, A CRITICAL LOOK: MONTANA’S NEW CONSTITUTION 6 (1972), available at
https://perma.cc/P6TZ-96UQ (internal punctuation marks omitted) (last visited Aug. 14, 2018).
59. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 15.
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Article II, Section 15, and explore potential approaches to the provision
moving forward.
A. General Rule
Right of persons not adults. The rights of persons under the age of 18 shall
include, but not be limited to, all the fundamental rights of this Article unless specifically precluded by laws which enhance the protection of such
persons.60

Perhaps most straightforward is the Court’s interpretation of the general rule of the rights-of-minors provision: that youth possess the same fundamental rights afforded to adults under Article II of the Montana Constitution.61 Similar to how the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights to the states, Article II, Section 15
incorporates the Declaration of Rights to minors. This general rule comes
with certain limitations, both textual and doctrinal. For example, Article II,
Section 14 provides: “[a] person 18 years of age or older is an adult for all
purposes, except that the legislature or the people by initiative may establish the legal age for purchasing, consuming, or possessing alcoholic beverages.”62 Indeed, it would make little sense to extend the provision setting
the age of adulthood to minors. Similarly, other provisions of Article II
appear to be incompatible with or irrelevant to the rights-of-minors provision, such as Section 32 (Civilian control of the military) or Section 35
(Servicemen, servicewomen, and veterans).63 The Montana Supreme Court
has also limited the scope of Section 15. As student-author Jennifer Shannon illustrates in her comment on the rights-of-minors provision, the Court
has refused to extend the right to counsel to children in dependent neglect
proceedings despite the corollary right guaranteed to their parents under the
due process clause of Article II, Section 17.64 Still, as Delegate Dahood
explained, the provision “will make sure that this Constitution and this Bill
of Rights does apply to all citizens regardless of age.”65
Since its adoption, Article II, Section 15 has come into play most frequently in the juvenile justice system and youth courts, as well as in family
law and healthcare law, particularly concerning minors’ rights to abortion.
Montana courts have read the general rule of Article II, Section 15 in con60. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 15 (emphasis added).
61. See, e.g., In re C.H., 683 P.2d 931, 940–41 (Mont. 1984); In re C.T.P., 87 P.3d 399, 406 (Mont.
2004).
62. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 14.
63. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 32; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 35.
64. Jennifer Shannon, The Analysis is Simple: A Child’s Right to Counsel in Dependent Neglect
Proceedings Under the Montana Constitution, 79 MONT. L. REV. 401, 422–25 (2018).
65. 5 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT, supra note 44, at 1750.
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junction with the other provisions contained in the Declaration of Rights.66
This reading is consistent with the plain language of the provision, as well
as the Bill of Right’s Committee’s goal in drafting and proposing it: “to
recognize that persons under the age of majority have the same protections
from governmental and majoritarian abuses as do adults.”67
For example, Article II, Sections 15, 24, and 25 together guarantee
minors the fundamental rights to counsel and to be free from self-incrimination in delinquency proceedings. The Court first recognized this right in In
re C.T.P. There, local law enforcement questioned 17-year-old C.T.P. in
connection with an incident that resulted in over $3,500 of damage to a
Townsend golf course.68 In his discussions with the investigating officers,
C.T.P. admitted he had been in Townsend the morning of the incident and
failed to explain why his jeans were grass-stained.69 At his subsequent
youth court trial, one of the deputies was allowed to testify to these statements.70 C.T.P. was found guilty of criminal mischief and adjudicated a
delinquent youth.71 On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court held that the
district court committed plain error in admitting the extrajudicial statements.72 The Court instructed that “Montana youths are constitutionally
guaranteed the same fundamental rights as adults . . . . [A] youth must be
advised of his right against self-incrimination and his right to counsel, and
the record does not reflect that this was done for C.T.P.”73 The Court noted
further that “an extrajudicial statement that would be constitutionally inadmissible in a criminal matter may not be received into evidence in a proceeding which alleges that a youth is delinquent.”74 Article II, Section 15
allowed the Court to reach this conclusion; as the Court makes clear, the
rights-of-minors provision extends the protections of Section 24 and 25 to
minors.
In the same vein, the Court has held that Article II, Section 15 read in
conjunction with Article II, Section 26 guarantees minors the right to a trial
by jury.75 In State v. E.M.R., a minor was charged with five counts of misdemeanor “dog at large” and one count of felony animal cruelty.76 At trial,
after the jury indicated it was deadlocked, the youth court instructed the
66.
E.M.R.,
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See, e.g., In re C.T.P., 87 P.3d at 405; Pengra v. State, 14 P.3d 499, 501 (Mont. 2000); State v.
292 P.3d 451, 456 (Mont. 2013).
5 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT, supra note 44, at 1750.
In re C.T.P., 87 P.3d at 401–03.
Id.
Id. at 404.
Id. at 402.
Id. at 405.
Id. (emphasis in original).
In re C.T.P., 87 P.3d. at 405.
State v. E.M.R., 292 P.3d 451, 456 (Mont. 2013).
Id. at 453.
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jury to consider the legislative purpose of the Montana Youth Court Act.77
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court held that instructing the jury on this
legislative policy “impermissibly injected irrelevant considerations into the
finding of facts and prejudicially affected E.M.R.’s substantial rights,”
namely the right to have guilt or innocence determined by the jury on the
basis of the evidence introduced at trial.78 Again, the Court grounded its
reasoning in Article II, Section 15.
Similarly, Article II, Sections 15 and 10 together guarantee the same
right of privacy afforded to adults under the Montana Constitution to minors. In Pengra v. State,79 the plaintiff-father brought suit against the State
of Montana for negligence after the rape and murder of his wife by a prison
probationer whom the State knew to be violent.80 The parties settled before
trial, and the father asked the court to seal the settlement agreement, arguing that his minor daughter possessed elevated privacy rights which demanded that the settlement agreement be protected.81 The trial court denied
the motion to seal the settlement agreement and the father appealed.82 Relying in part on the plain language of Article II, Section 15 and reading it with
Section 10, the Court held that minors have the same—not elevated—rights
as adults.83
B. Equal Protection
In addition to its determination that Article II, Section 15 generally
provides minors with rights equivalent to those of adults, the Montana Supreme Court has held that courts must read Article II, Section 15 in conjunction with the Equal Protection Clause contained in Article II, Section 4
of the Montana Constitution.84 According to the Court, this is because one
of the primary purposes of Article II, Section 15 was to rectify the fact that
minors had not received full recognition under the Equal Protection Clause
of the United States Constitution.85 The basic premise of equal protection is
“that persons similarly situated with respect to a legitimate governmental
purpose of the law must receive like treatment.”86 This right is guaranteed
by Article II, Section 4, which expressly prohibits discrimination based on
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
2012).
85.
86.

Id. at 454.
Id. at 456.
14 P.3d 499 (Mont. 2000).
Id. at 500.
Id. at 500–01.
Id. at 501.
Id.
In re S.L.M., 951 P.2d 1365, 1372 (Mont. 1997); In re S.M.K.–S.H., 290 P.3d 718, 722 (Mont.
In re S.M.K.-S.H., 290 P.3d at 722.
Id. at 723 (quoting Kershaw v. Mont. Dep’t of Transp., 257 P.3d 358, 362 (Mont. 2011)).
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“race, color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, or political or religious
ideas.”87 Section 4 contains no such protection for age.88
Under Montana law, the first step of an equal protection analysis requires the court to identify the classes involved and decide whether they are
similarly situated to each other.89 If they are not, the analysis ends. If the
classes are similar, the court will then determine whether a suspect classification exists.90 A suspect class is one “saddled with such disabilities, or
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to
such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.”91 Montana marches lockstep with the United States Supreme Court holding that age is not a suspect
classification.92 The next step of the analysis requires the court to “define
the nature of the interest affected,” or whether a fundamental right is infringed.93 If so, the court will apply strict scrutiny, requiring a compelling
state interest to infringe the fundamental right.94
The Court does not always adhere to its own edict that Article II, Section 15 must be read in conjunction with Article II, Section 4. In Pengra,
for example, the Court did not undertake an equal protection analysis when
considering Article II, Section 15.95 Instead, it concluded that “[b]ased on
the absence of an elevated-protection provision in either the Montana Constitution or the statute, we conclude that minors do not have a greater right
to privacy than do adults in settlement agreements for tort claims against
the State.”96 Similarly, in E.M.R., the Court bypassed any consideration of
equal protection in its Article II, Section 15 analysis.97 Rather, it succinctly
concluded that the “inviolate” right to a trial by jury secured in Article II,
Section 26 extends to children via Article II, Section 15.98 Instead, the
Court generally conducts an equal protection analysis only when the parties
raise an equal protection challenge. The following examples are illustrative.
In In re C.H., the youth court adjudicated 14-year-old C.H., a “youth
in need of supervision,” for habitual school truancy, and issued a Consent
Order instructing C.H. to attend all high school classes and counseling ses87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
Id.
In re S.L.M., 951 P.2d at 1371.
Id.
Id. (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
See Pengra v. State, 14 P.3d 499 (Mont. 2000).
Id. at 501.
See State v. E.M.R., 292 P.3d 451 (Mont. 2013).
E.M.R., 292 P.3d at 456.
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sions.99 The Consent Order specified that C.H.’s failure to comply with
these terms and conditions might prompt the youth court to declare her a
delinquent youth, a more severe designation.100 C.H. violated the terms of
the Consent Order and the youth court adjudicated her a delinquent youth
and sentenced her to the Mountain View Home for Girls (“Mountain View
Home”) for 45 days.101 C.H. appealed, challenging the statutory scheme
that allowed her to be adjudicated a delinquent youth and confined to
Mountain View Home.102 She alleged that the statutes were unconstitutional under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses and that they
violated her right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.103
The Court began its equal protection analysis by identifying the similarly situated classes as youths in need of supervision and delinquent youths
who have violated a youth court order.104 The Court then determined that
delinquent youths do not constitute a suspect class because the classification is age-based.105 Next, the Court addressed the nature of the individual
interest affected. C.H. argued that by sentencing her to Mountain View
Home for 45 days, the youth court impermissibly infringed upon her physical liberty.106 The Court held that, in contrast to the federal constitution, the
Montana Constitution protects a fundamental right to physical liberty.107
Having made this determination, the Court proceeded to the final step of the
analysis: identifying a compelling interest sufficient to justify the infringement of C.H.’s physical liberty.108 The Court concluded that the rehabilitation, supervision, and care afforded C.H. by her court-ordered commitment
served a compelling state interest.109
Similarly, in In re S.L.M., the Court held unconstitutional a provision
of the Montana Youth Court Act, the Extended Jurisdiction Prosecution Act
(EJPA), which effectively allowed juveniles to receive harsher, longer
sentences than adults convicted of the same offense.110 Petitioners, a group
of juveniles sentenced under the EJPA, challenged its constitutionality,
claiming it violated their equal protection, due process, and double jeopardy
rights, as well as their rights under Article II, Section 15.111
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

In re C.H., 683 P.2d 931, 933–35 (Mont. 1984).
Id. at 933.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 938.
See id.
Id. at 938–39.
Id. at 940.
Id. at 940–41.
Id. at 941.
In re S.L.M., 951 P.2d 1365, 1375 (Mont. 1997).
Id. at 1367.
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Again, the Court undertook an equal protection analysis. First, the
Court identified the two classes involved: one consisted of juveniles sentenced as adults under the EJPA, while the second consisted of adults sentenced for committing the same offense as the juveniles in question.112 The
two classes, the Court reasoned, were similarly situated because they both
included persons who have committed the same act and are sentenced as
adults.113 Next, the Court determined that because a classification between
adult and juvenile offenders is based on age, no suspect classification was at
play.114 The Court then defined the nature of the individual interest affected
by the EJPA as physical liberty.115 As established in In re C.H., physical
liberty is a fundamental right guaranteed under the Montana Constitution
and extended to minors by Article II, Section 15.116 The Court determined
that the confinement terms under the EJPA infringed petitioners’ physical
liberty.117 Such infringement, the Court held, triggers strict scrutiny and the
need for a compelling state interest.118 Unable to identify such an interest,
the Court held the EJPA violated Article II, Section 4 (equal protection) and
Article II, Section 15 of the Montana Constitution.119 It declined to address
the double jeopardy and due process challenges.120
Wicklund v. State121 provides yet another example of a Montana
court’s dual equal protection and Section 15 analysis. Wicklund arose out of
a minor’s challenge of the Parental Notice of Abortion Act under Article II,
Sections 4 and 15.122 The Act, as written at the time, required pregnant
minors seeking abortions to notify their parents about the pregnancy and
their decision to have an abortion, and to obtain parental consent or satisfy
stringent judicial bypass requirements.123 The plaintiffs contended that the
Act unconstitutionally invaded the privacy rights of minors seeking abortions.124
Undertaking an equal protection analysis, the court first identified the
classes involved—pregnant minors who want to obtain an abortion and
pregnant minors who do not—and determined that they were similarly situ112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 1371.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1371–73.
Id. at 1373.
Id. at 1373–75.
Id. at 1375.
Id. at 1367.
1999 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 1116 (Mont. Feb. 11, 1999).
Id. at *1.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50–20–21 (1995).
Wicklund, 1999 Mont. Dist. LEXIS, at *7.
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ated.125 Next, the district court concluded the class of “minor pregnant woman” does not constitute a suspect class.126 It then determined that the individual interest affected was the right to privacy guaranteed by Article II,
Section 10 and incorporated to minors through Article II, Section 15.127 The
right to privacy, the court noted, includes personal-autonomy privacy,
which in turn encompasses a woman’s right to decide whether to terminate
her pregnancy.128
Finally, the district court determined that the Act invades the privacy
rights of minors seeking an abortion.129 The district court cited numerous
studies and empirical evidence to reach this conclusion, including the fact
that minors who choose not to tell their parents about their pregnancy often
have a good reason for not doing so, such as fear of domestic violence or
being forced to leave home.130 In other instances, the district court noted,
minors are employed, living apart from their parents, and already have children.131 Still other minors wish to protect information of their pregnancy for
fear of being pressured into obtaining an abortion.132 Based on this information, the district court concluded that the Act infringed fundamental privacy
rights of minors who wish to terminate their pregnancies, triggering strict
scrutiny and the showing of a compelling state interest.133 As discussed in
greater detail below, the district court ultimately determined that the State’s
asserted interests failed to justify the intrusion.134
C. Exception for “Enhanced Protections”
Rights of persons not adults. The rights of persons under the age of 18 shall
include, but not be limited to, all the fundamental rights of this Article unless specifically precluded by laws which enhance the protection of such
persons.135

While the general rule extends the fundamental rights enjoyed by
adults to minors, the Montana Supreme Court has determined that the exception carved from the rule—that a law designed to enhance the protection
of minors may infringe upon fundamental rights—must meet a special kind
of scrutiny: not only must the State show a compelling interest, but it must
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at *4–5.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *5–6.
Id. at *6–7.
Id. at *11.
Id. at *6–11.
Id. at *7–8.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *11.
Id. at *11–19.
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 15 (emphasis added).
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also demonstrate that the exception is designed to enhance the protection of
minors.136 Much like the verbatim transcripts of the Convention debate, the
Court’s rights-of-minors jurisprudence provides only a broad outline of the
types of laws which enhance protections and rights of minors. To start, the
Court has identified certain laws which fail this special strict scrutiny because they reduce—rather than enhance—those rights.137 For example, the
Court held in In re S.L.M. that the EJPA’s infringement of petitioners’
physical liberty did not enhance his or her rights. “A juvenile enjoys all the
rights and privileges of an adult unless the law at issue affords more, not
less, protection to the juvenile,” the Court stated.138 “Infringement of an
EJPA offender’s liberty for a longer period of time than an adult under like
circumstances does not enhance a juvenile’s rights.”139
Still, this doctrine of “enhanced protections” is hard to trace. Again,
before the Court can determine the presence of an enhanced protection, it
must first reach the conclusion that a minor’s fundamental right has been
infringed.140 As discussed above, the Court might reach this conclusion
with or without an equal protection analysis; either way, it is the invasion of
the fundamental right—not the suspect classification—that triggers strict
scrutiny and the need for a compelling state interest. Once strict scrutiny is
triggered, the Court determines whether a compelling state interest that enhances the protection of minors’ rights exists to justify the infringement. “In
contrast to the federal constitution, the Montana Constitution specifically
compares the rights of children with those of adults. It recognizes that the
State’s interest in protecting children may conflict with their fundamental
rights.”141 However, as demonstrated in the rights-of-minors cases, the
Court has not established a consistent approach to the enhanced protections
subpart of the rights-of-minors provision. This makes it difficult for courts
and lawyers to determine when and how to analyze enhanced protections.
In In re C.H., the Court concluded that C.H.’s confinement at Mountain View Home infringed upon her fundamental right to physical liberty.142
However, according to the Court, the state possessed a compelling interest
in C.H.’s right to be supervised, cared for, and rehabilitated.143 This com136. See, e.g., In re S.L.M., 951 P.2d 1365, 1373 (Mont. 1997); State v. Strong, 203 P.3d 848, 851
(Mont. 2009). The confusion surrounding Article II, Section 15 is apparent in In re S.L.M. There, the
Court explains that the State must show a compelling state interest and demonstrate that the exception is
designed to enhance the rights of minors, rather than the protection of minors. This not only misstates
the rule but demonstrates the Court’s inconsistent application.
137. See, e.g., In re S.L.M., 951 P.2d 1365; Wicklund, 1999 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 1116.
138. In re S.L.M., 951 P.2d at 1375 (emphasis in original).
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., In re S.L.M., 951 P.2d at 1373; In re C.H., 683 P.2d 931, 940–41 (Mont. 1984).
141. Id. at 940.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 941.
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pelling state interest outweighed C.H.’s fundamental right to physical liberty.144 In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that the rights of
children do not equate with those of adults.145 Unlike adults, children are
especially vulnerable and unable to make critical decisions in an informed,
mature manner.146 Furthermore, the State must recognize the importance of
the parental role in child-rearing.147 Therefore, the Court reasoned that the
compelling state interest determination involves balancing the juvenile’s
right against the State’s intrusion.148 “This is precisely what the drafters of
the 1972 Montana Constitution had in mind when they explicitly recognized that persons under 18 years of age would enjoy the same fundamental
rights as adults, unless exceptions were made for their own protection,”
wrote the Court.149
In In re S.L.M., the Court similarly found that the challenged state
act—the EJPA—infringed the juvenile defendants’ fundamental right to
physical liberty.150 This time, the Court ruled that the State lacked a compelling interest in treating juveniles as adults and restricting their physical
liberty to a greater degree than similarly situated adults.151 Citing directly to
Article II, Section 15 the Court clarified that, under the Montana Constitution, “a juvenile enjoys all the rights and privileges of an adult unless the
law at issue affords more, not less, protection to the juvenile.”152 Infringing
a juvenile’s physical liberty for a longer period of time than a similarly
situated adult does not afford more—or enhanced—protection.153
The district court in Wicklund approached the enhanced protection
analysis in a slightly different manner. After concluding that the Parental
Notice of Abortion Act infringed minors’ fundamental privacy rights, the
court stated, “the next step [in the analysis] is the determination of whether
there is a compelling state interest sufficient to justify the Act’s infringement on the class’ fundamental right to privacy.”154 It considered the four
compelling interests the State advanced to justify the infringement: “(a)
protecting minors against their own immaturity; (b) fostering family unity
and preserving the family as a viable social unit; (c) protecting the constitutional rights of parents to rear children who are members of their house144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re S.L.M., 951 P.2d 1365, 1375 (Mont. 1997).
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
Wicklund v. State, 1999 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 1116, at *11 (Mont. Feb. 11, 1999).
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hold; and (d) reducing teenage pregnancy and unnecessary abortion.”155
Turning to studies on teen pregnancy and abortion, the district court concluded that the undisputed psychological and medical evidence undermined
the compelling interests advanced by the State.156
The district court then proceeded to “the last step” of its analysis—the
determination of whether the Act, despite its proscription of the plaintiffs’
fundamental privacy rights, enhanced the protection of minors.157 The court
again cited empirical evidence that medical risks for abortions are considerably lower than the risks associated with pregnancy and childbirth, and that
adolescents show no substantial psychological effects from abortion.158
Rather, the court reasoned that choosing to continue a pregnancy can entail
severe social and economic consequences, such as failing to complete high
school, and increased medical and health risks for the children who are
likely to be born prematurely and have low birth weight.159 In light of this
evidence, the court concluded that the Act did not enhance the protection of
minors and found it unconstitutional.160
D. The “But Not Be Limited To” Language
Right of persons not adults. The rights of persons under the age of 18 shall
include, but not be limited to, all the fundamental rights of this Article unless specifically precluded by laws which enhance the protection of such
persons.161

The Court has not addressed the provision’s “but not limited to” language. The plain language of Article II, Section 15 declares the scope of the
provision may extend beyond the fundamental rights contained within Article II.162 As previously mentioned, the delegates’ discussion of the rightsof-minors provision provides limited guidance as to what this might mean.
Likewise, the Court has not defined this language in construing the provision as a whole. In fact, the Court sometimes omits it altogether in referencing and applying the right.163 This language—and its potential future use—
is explored in Part IV.
155. Id.
156. Id. at *12–19.
157. Id. at *20–21.
158. Id.
159. Id. at *21.
160. Id. at *22.
161. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 15 (emphasis added).
162. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 15.
163. See, e.g., In re C.H., 683 P.2d 931, 940 (Mont. 1984) (stating “Article II, Sec. 15 provides: ‘The
rights of persons under 18 years of age shall include . . . all the fundamental rights of this Article unless
specifically precluded by laws which enhance the protection of such persons.’ ”).
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT’S INTERPRETATION
OF ARTICLE II, SECTION 15
A. The Problem with Equal Protection
The purpose of Article II, Section 15 as expressed by the Framers was
to fully recognize that minors are entitled to the same rights as adults, including not only equal protection but all other rights contained in Article
II.164 At the same time, the Court has determined that Article II, Section 15
necessitates consideration of Article II, Section 4 because one of the primary purposes of Section 15 is to remedy the fact that minors had not received full recognition under the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution.165 This pronouncement is incongruous with the Court’s
reasoning on the rights-of-minors provision. Not all minors’ rights cases
involve an equal protection claim, and the Court’s instruction that an analysis under Section 15 should trigger equal protection considerations potentially leads to redundant or even futile inquiries incompatible with the text,
history, and structure of Article II, Section 15.
As many of the cases illustrate, Section 15 does not necessarily require
an equal protection analysis. “The basic premise of equal protection is that
persons similarly situated with respect to a legitimate governmental purpose
of the law must receive like treatment.”166 Children are sometimes similarly
situated to adults, as in In re S.L.M. However, as the rights-of-minors cases
illustrate, children’s rights do not equate with those of adults.167 Furthermore, the plain text of Article II, Section 15 expressly allows for different
treatment if such treatment enhances the protections of minors.168
The Court’s insistence that Article II, Section 15 requires an equal protection analysis is confusing for other reasons. As discussed earlier, the
Court itself does not undertake an equal protection analysis each time a
challenge is brought or decided under Article II, Section 15.169 Furthermore, Montana marches lock-step with the United States Supreme Court in
holding that age-based distinctions do not constitute suspect classifications.170 As a result, where the Court has invalidated laws or reversed decisions under Article II, Section 15, it has done so because those laws or
decisions infringe upon a fundamental right and lack a compelling state
164. 5 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSCRIPT, supra note 44, at 1750–53.
165. In re S.M.K.-S.H., 290 P.3d 718, 722 (Mont. 2012).
166. Id. at 723 (quoting Kershaw v. Mont. Dep’t of Transp., 257 P.3d 358, 362 (Mont. 2011)).
167. In re C.H., 683 P.2d at 941.
168. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 15.
169. See, e.g., Pengra v. State, 14 P.3d 499 (Mont. 2000); In re C.T.P., 87 P.3d 399 (Mont. 2004);
State v. E.M.R., 292 P.3d 451 (Mont. 2013).
170. In re C.H., 683 P.3d at 938; In re Wood, 768 P.2d 1370, 1375 (Mont. 1989); In re S.L.M., 951
P.2d 1365, 1371 (Mont. 1997) (citing In re Wood, 768 P.2d at 1375).
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interest that enhances the protection of minors, not because the laws trigger
strict scrutiny by targeting a suspect class.171
Even the Court’s decision to align with the United States Supreme
Court in holding that children are not a class “saddled with such disabilities
. . . as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process”172 seems incompatible with Article II, Section 15 itself and the
premises on which it rests. The Bill of Rights Committee proposed Article
II, Section 15 “in recognition of the fact that young people have not been
held to possess basic civil rights.”173 The Court has explicitly acknowledged that Article II, Section 15 is unique to the Montana Constitution,
stating, “no such provision exists in the federal constitution.”174 Despite its
own recognition of this critical distinction between the federal and Montana
constitutions vis-à-vis the rights of minors, the Court has adopted from federal precedent the holding that age does not constitute a suspect class. Ultimately, federal equal protection considerations of age do not necessarily fit
Montana’s unique guarantee of fundamental rights to minors. The Court
could reconsider its holding that Article II, Section 15 must be read alongside the equal protection clause contained in Section 4, or consider including age in its list of suspect classifications.
B. Clarifying Enhanced Protections
The Court might also clarify what it means to enhance the protection
of minors. At the Constitutional Convention, Delegate Monroe provided
two examples of laws designed to enhance the protections of minors: laws
setting the legal drinking age and laws setting the minimum age required to
obtain a driver’s license.175 While the Court has ruled that certain laws enhance protections of minors and that others reduce those protections, it has
not specifically explained why or how.
The Court can establish a clear analytical approach to the “enhanced
protections” determination. The plain language of the rights-of-minors provision states that a law infringing a minor’s fundamental rights must en171. See, e.g., In re S.L.M., 951 P.32 at 1372 (holding that age-based distinctions do not trigger strict
scrutiny, but also that the imposition of an adult sentence as well as a juvenile disposition infringes a
juvenile’s fundamental right to physical liberty, triggering strict scrutiny); Wicklund v. State, 1999
Mont. Dist. LEXIS 1116, at *6, *11 (Mont. Feb. 11, 1999) (holding that the class of minor pregnant
women is not a suspect class, but that minors have a fundamental right to individual privacy, and that the
statute at issue infringes this right).
172. In re S.L.M., 951 P.3d at 1371 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
28 (1973)).
173. 5 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT, supra note 44, at 1750.
174. In re C.H., 683 P.2d at 941.
175. 5 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT, supra note 44, at 1751.
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hance the protections of minors to pass constitutional muster.176 The Court
has thrown a compelling state interest requirement into the mix but has
failed to complete its analysis. As illustrated in In re C.H., In re S.L.M., and
Wicklund, the Court’s compelling state interest analysis serves an identical
purpose to the enhanced protection inquiry and is therefore redundant as it
stands. In In re C.H., the compelling state interests of supervising, caring
for, and rehabilitating C.H. outweighed her fundamental right to physical
liberty.177 According to the Court, the compelling state interest was designed for C.H.’s “own protection” in compliance with Article II, Section
15.178 In In re S.L.M., the Court concluded that “the State has not shown a
compelling interest to be advanced by this unequal treatment . . . nor has it
shown that the EJPA provides juveniles with increased, rather than decreased, protection under the law.”179 And in Wicklund, although the district court separated the compelling state interest and enhanced protection
inquiries into two discrete steps—determining first whether the Act advanced a compelling state interest and second whether the compelling interest enhanced the protections of minors—it could have easily consolidated
these steps into one.180 The redundancy is evident in the district court’s
analysis. Turning from the compelling state interest to the enhanced protection prong, the court restates that the “undisputed evidence contradicts the
compelling state interests and statements of purposes expressed in the
Act.”181 The court then explicitly redirects the reader to its compelling state
interest analysis, and cites the same empirical data in support of both determinations.182
The rights at issue in an Article II, Section 15 inquiry are the rights
contained in Article II of the Montana Constitution—fundamental rights.
Under Montana (and federal) law, infringement of a fundamental right triggers strict scrutiny, which in turn requires not only a compelling state interest, but also narrow tailoring.183 Without ever holding or announcing it, the
Court has essentially integrated narrow tailoring into its Article II, Section
15 analysis. As demonstrated in In re C.H., In re S.L.M., and Wicklund, the
Court has required that a law infringing the rights of minors be narrowly
tailored to enhance the protections of such persons. Therefore, the Court
might consider reframing and explicitly recognizing this approach to, and
analysis of, Article II, Section 15.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

MONT. CONST. art. II, § 15.
In re C.H., 683 P.2d at 941.
Id. at 941.
In re S.L.M., 951 P.2d 1365, 1375 (Mont. 1997).
Wicklund v. State, 1999 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 1116, at *11, *20 (Mont. Feb. 11, 1999).
Id. at *21.
Id. at *21–22.
See, e.g., Snetsinger v. Mont. Univ. Sys., 104 P.3d 445, 450 (Mont. 2004).
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C. The “But not be limited to” Language: Room to Grow?
At the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention, Delegate Monroe expressed the desire of the Bill of Rights Committee, that “whatever rights
and privileges might be given to [juveniles] in the future, we also want to
protect them.”184 Aside from this possible reference, neither the Convention
documents nor the Court’s rights-of-minors jurisprudence provide an explanation of the “but not be limited to” clause of Article II, Section 15. The
Court has neglected to address the meaning of this part of the provision. In
fact, the Court frequently replaces this language with ellipses when citing
the provision.185 This sub-section suggests one possible reading of this language: an invitation to extend to minors the fundamental rights of Article II
in a way that accommodates their unique status and the fundamental differences between youth and adults.
In its line of cases on Article II, Section 15 the Montana Supreme
Court has proffered conflicting interpretations of the provision. On the one
hand, the Court has stated that “it is axiomatic that the younger a minor is,
the more protection she may require,”186 and that “Montana recognizes that
youths are to be given special treatment by the courts.”187 The Court has
further concluded that “youths are entitled to same or greater due process
rights as adults.”188 In In re C.H., the Court recognized that “minors and
adults are qualitatively different,” and, therefore, that the “constitutional
rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults.”189 Despite these
pronouncements recognizing the fundamental distinctions between minors
and adults, the Court has also declared that minors do not enjoy a fundamental right to treatment as juveniles.190 While this may be the case, perhaps the “but not be limited to” language can modulate the fundamental
rights they do enjoy—those in Article II with the limitations discussed
above.
184. 5 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT, supra note 44, at 1750.
185. See, e.g., In re C.H., 683 P.2d at 940 (stating that “Article II, Section 15 provides: ‘The rights
of persons under 18 years of age shall include . . . all the fundamental rights of this Article unless
specifically precluded by laws which enhance the protection of such persons.’ ”).
186. Planned Parenthood v. State, 342 P.3d 684, 688 (Mont. 2015) (declining to decide the constitutionality of two laws requiring involvement of a minor’s parents before that minor may obtain an abortion because the lower court erred in granting summary judgment to plaintiffs on issue preclusion
grounds).
187. In re Appeal of Cascade Cty. Dist. Court, 219 P.3d 1255, 1258 (Mont. 2009) (holding constitutional a Youth Court Act statute allowing formal youth court disposition for violation of informal consent adjustment).
188. In re G.T.M., 222 P.3d 626, 630 (Mont. 2009) (emphasis added).
189. In re C.H., 683 P.2d at 941 (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 662 (1979)).
190. In re Wood, 768 P.2d 1370, 1376 (Mont. 1989) (holding constitutional statute allowing for
transfer from youth court to district court), superseded by statute as recognized in State v. Butler, 977
P.2d 1000 (Mont. 1999).
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Arguably, the history and text of Article II, Section 15—a provision
entirely unique to the Montana Constitution—lends itself to the proposition
that juveniles are, in fact, entitled to treatment as juveniles. The rights-ofminors provision incorporates Article II to persons under the age of 18; in
general, the fundamental rights of adults and minors are coextensive.191 The
provision also permits the infringement of minors’ fundamental rights when
that infringement enhances the protection of minors.192 This is permissible
precisely because of the fundamental differences between children and
adults.193 In the same way, the “but not be limited to” language of the provision might recognize this distinction. In other words, the “but not be limited to” language contemplates something beyond “all the fundamental
rights of this Article.” Arguably, this does not just incorporate the rights
enumerated in Article II to minors; it molds them to fit the special characteristics of youth.
In a recent decision, the Montana Supreme Court adopted a line of
federal precedent holding that the meaningful protection of minors requires
different treatment that accounts for the fundamental differences between
minors and adults.194 This precedent can be instructive for the Court’s interpretation of Article II, Section 15 moving forward.
1. Eighth Amendment Cases
A relatively recent line of decision handed down by the United States
Supreme Court has clarified its position that minors are entitled to unique
constitutional protections in the criminal justice context. In 2005, the Court
held in Roper v. Simmons195 that sentencing an individual to death for a
crime committed as a minor is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.196 In 2010, the Court held in Graham v. Florida197 that a sentence of
life without parole is constitutionally impermissible for individuals convicted of non-homicidal crimes committed as a minor.198 Then, in 2012, the
191. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 15. See also In re S.L.M., 951 P.2d 1365, 1373 (Mont. 1997) (stating
that “[c]learly under Article II, Section 15, minors . . . enjoy all the fundamental rights of an adult under
Article II.”).
192. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 15. See also In re S.M.K.–S.H., 290 P.3d 718, 724 (Mont. 2012)
(stating that “[f]urthermore, the Youth Court extended S.M.K.–S.H.’s probation to enhance his protections and to provide him with additional support to make good life decisions.”).
193. See In re C.H., 683 P.2d at 941 (noting that “the fact that a youth has been adjudged a delinquent youth ‘usually demonstrates the need for stronger and wiser authority,” and that adults and children are “quantitatively different.”).
194. Steilman v. Michael, 407 P.3d 313 (Mont. 2017).
195. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
196. Id. at 578.
197. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
198. Id. at 82.
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Court in Miller v. Alabama199 extended this prohibition to individuals convicted of homicide committed as minors, absent an individualized sentencing determination requiring the sentencing judge to consider mitigating factors such as age and the nature of the crime.200 Finally, in 2016, the Court
held in Montgomery v. Louisiana201 that Miller applied retroactively.202 The
Court further held that a sentence of life without the possibility of parole is
unconstitutional for any juvenile, except for a small category of youth
whose crimes reflect “irreparable corruption.”203
In each opinion, the Court cited to three critical attributes that distinguish youth from adults that warrant different legal treatment for minors
and adults: first, children lack maturity and possess an underdeveloped
sense of responsibility that gives rise to recklessness, impulsivity, and risktaking; second, children are more vulnerable to negative influences and peer
pressure; and third, a child’s character is transient and less developed than
an adult’s, meaning that his or her actions are less likely to be evidence of
irretrievable depravity.204
2. Steilman v. Michael
The Montana Supreme Court adopted Miller and Montgomery in
Steilman v. Michael.205 Citing the three distinctions between youth and
adults outlined in Roper, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery, the Court concluded that the sentence of life without parole itself is cruel and unusual for
juvenile offenders under the Eighth Amendment.206 Therefore, the Court
held that Montana judges must consider the distinctive attributes of youth
when sentencing youth to life without parole under both mandatory and
discretionary sentencing schemes.207 The Court confined its holding to a
strict definition of life without parole. The Court reasoned that because
Steilman, who at 17 received a term-of-years sentence of 110 years for deliberate homicide, could be eligible for parole after serving 55 years contingent upon his behavior, his sentence was not a de facto life sentence.208 In
short, Miller and Montgomery do not apply to a term-of-years sentence.209
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

567 U.S. 460 (2012).
Id. at 489.
136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
Id. at 736–37.
Id.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005).
Steilman v. Michael, 407 P.3d 313, 317–18 (Mont. 2017).
Id.
Id. at 318–19.
Id. at 319–20.
Id.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol79/iss2/5

24

Stursberg: Still in Flux
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\79-2\MON205.txt

2018

unknown

Seq: 25

STILL IN FLUX

16-OCT-18

13:46

283

Three justices dissented from the majority opinion. Justice Wheat, with
whom Justice Sandefur concurred, concluded that sentencing a 17-year-old
to 110 years with a conditional minimum of 45 years is the practical
equivalent of a sentence of life without parole and therefore falls within the
scope of Miller.210 In a separate dissent, Justice McKinnon concluded that
imposition of life without parole on juvenile offenders requires more than
the consideration of the mitigating factors of youth; it requires evidence of
irreparable corruption.211 This is because Montgomery makes clear that, except for the rarest occasions of permanent corruption, the distinctive attributes of youth eradicate any justifications for imposing such a sentence.212
3. Harmonizing Steilman and Article II, Section 15
The idea that children and adults are constitutionally different is not
peculiar to United States Supreme Court precedent. In fact, in deciding
Roper and its progeny, that court took its lead from a growing consensus in
state supreme courts and legislatures that distinctive attributes of youth necessitate different treatment of minors for sentencing purposes.213 Nor is the
idea peculiar to the Eighth Amendment, Article II, Section 22 of the Montana Constitution, or the sentencing realm. As mentioned previously, these
very distinctions guide lawmakers in establishing minimum drinking and
driving ages. They are also embodied in the “enhanced protections” exceptions to Article II, Section 15. Accordingly, the “but not be limited to” language of Article II, Section 15, which the Framers and the Montana Supreme Court have left open for interpretation, leaves room for the Court to
integrate the precepts of Roper and its progeny and Steilman. The Court
could use this clause to recognize that the protection of minors’ fundamental rights requires considerations inherently distinct from those applied to
adults. As Justice McKinnon points out in her dissent, “children are constitutionally different from adults in their level of culpability.”214 The “but not
be limited to” language might extend this pronouncement beyond the realm
of sentencing. As the dissent acknowledges, what may pass constitutional
muster for adults—here, a sentence of life without parole—may violate the
Constitution with respect to minors.215
210. Id. at 321 (Wheat, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 324 (McKinnon, J., dissenting).
212. Id. (citing Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016)).
213. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 579–87 apps. A–D (2005) (surveying states that
permit and prohibit the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles; state statutes establishing a minimum age for jury service; state statutes establishing a minimum age for marriage without parental or
judicial consent.).
214. Steilman, 407 P.3d at 324 (McKinnon, J., dissenting).
215. Id.
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The reasoning in Steilman aligns with the considerations of Article II,
Section 15. The general rule of the rights-of-minors provision incorporates
Article II, Section 22 to minors. Therefore, minors enjoy the fundamental
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Limiting the fundamental right to be free from such punishment cannot be said to enhance the
protection of minors. However, the “but not be limited to” language affords
the Montana Supreme Court and lawmakers the opportunity to adapt Article
II, Section 22 to the distinctive attributes of youth.
V. CONCLUSION
The scope and purpose of Article II, Section 15 have yet to be clarified. At minimum, Article II, Section 15 should not be construed to provide
fewer, or more proscribed, fundamental rights to minors. Nationwide, state
and federal courts are increasingly aware that the conditions of youth require special treatment. Article II, Section 15 can be construed to provide
this treatment. The provision’s plain language extends the fundamental
rights possessed by adults to minors. Arguably, it also allows for the incorporation of rights to minors in a way that reflects the differences between
minors and adults. The “but not limited to” language, left open-ended by
the Convention delegates, can bridge this divide. So, along with growing
judicial recognition of the constitutional differences between minors and
adults, Montana courts can interpret Article II, Section 15 to accommodate
the “distinctive attributes of youth.”
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